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participation, fertility, labor market regulation, redistribution, growth, and financial 
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Societies di⁄er markedly in their economic outcomes. This is evidenced in a va-
riety of ways: from di⁄erent choices of redistributive policies and social security
provisions to di⁄erences in aggregate outcomes such as average savings rates, fer-
tility rates, or women￿ s participation rate in the formal labor market. As shown
in cross-country opinion polls, social attitudes also vary. On average, across coun-
tries people hold di⁄erent views of, for example, the role that luck versus merit
plays in generating income, the degree of social obligation one has towards others,
or the importance of thrift as a moral virtue. These di⁄erences in social attitudes
tend to be correlated with the di⁄erences in cross-country economic outcomes. For
example, countries in which people value thrift also tend to have higher savings
rates. Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2006) ￿nd that a one-standard-deviation
increase in the share of people who value thriftiness is associated with an increase
in the national saving rate of 1.8 percentage points.1 Similarly, countries that hold
a more traditional view of women￿ s role tend to have lower female labor force par-
ticipation and higher fertility. For example, using attitude data from the World
Value Survey (WVS), one ￿nds that the percentage of individuals in a country that
think that housework is as ful￿lling as having a job is negatively and signi￿cantly
correlated with female labor force participation (LFP) across countries.2 Lastly,
countries in which people tend to think that luck plays a fundamental role in the
income process also have higher redistribution. Alesina and Angeletos (2005)
show that the share of respondents in each country who believe that luck deter-
mines income is highly correlated with that country￿ s spending in social welfare as
a proportion of GDP.
Is the correlation between social attitudes and economic outcomes due en-
tirely to economic and institutional di⁄erences across societies or are potentially
systematic di⁄erences in social beliefs playing a causal role? More generally, what
1This is calculated from answers to survey questions from the World Value Survey.
2These calculation use data from the WVS and from the OECD as reported in FernÆndez
(2007b).
1role do di⁄erences in the distribution of social preferences and beliefs (what I will
henceforth call culture) play in explaining the variation in economic outcomes be
it at the level of countries, social groups (e.g., ethnic or socioeconomic groups), or
over time?
For a long period of time, questions regarding the role of culture in economic
outcomes were largely absent in economic research. This was primarily the result
of the absence of an empirical methodology that would allow one to investigate
this issue. In particular, it re￿ ected the di¢ culty in ￿nding an approach that
was capable of distinguishing the e⁄ects of culture from those of the economic and
institutional environment in which economic decisions are taken. Did di⁄erences in
aggregate outcomes across countries, for example, arise because they had di⁄erent
economic and institutional environments or because social attitudes were di⁄erent?
Standard approaches to this question, such as the use of cross-country regressions
on a large variety of variables that are meant to capture economic and institutional
di⁄erences across countries, identify culture with the regression residual. This
approach, however is fraught with problems of omitted variables and endogeneity,
compounded by mismeasurement.
In the last decade there have been a variety of new approaches that provide
more persuasive evidence that culture matters. Some of the evidence comes from
historical case studies that have attempted to use ￿natural experiments￿to identify
the e⁄ect of culture (e.g., Botticini and Eckstein (2005) or Greif (1994)). Some
evidence has been provided by experiments showing that, on average, individuals
from di⁄erent social groups play di⁄erent strategies in games such as the dictator
game or public goods game (e.g. Henrich, Boyd, Bowles, Camerer, Fehr, Gintis,
and McElreath (2001)). Better instruments for culture have also strengthened the
case in favor of culture￿ s impact on economic outcomes (see, e.g. Tabellini (2010)
and Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2004)). Finally a large portion of evidence
has come from following what I have called ￿the epidemiological approach￿(see
FernÆndez (2008)) to which this chapter is mostly devoted. The epidemiological
approach attempts to separate culture from the environment by studying the out-
2comes of individuals whose cultures potentially di⁄er, but in a common economic
and institutional setting.
This chapter will primarily focus on the epidemiological approach to culture
although some of the experimental and historical evidence will also be reviewed.
A chapter by Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales in this handbook provides a more
thorough review of the literature that uses instrumental variables, particularly for
understanding social capital, and FernÆndez (2008) reviews several of the historical
case studies. This chapter is organized as follows: the next section provides a
de￿nition as well as some historical evidence for how cultures di⁄er, and reviews
some of the experimental literature. Section three develops a theoretical frame-
work for the epidemiological approach and discusses the empirical challenges in
the context of an example. Section four reviews the epidemiological literature and
the last section concludes.
2 Some Preliminaries
Before proceeding with a review of the literature on culture and economics, a
de￿nition of culture is useful, even if it is left somewhat vague.3 In general
terms, we may think of culture as a body of shared knowledge, understanding,
and practice. According to the Merriam Webster dictionary, culture is: ￿the
integrated pattern of human knowledge, belief, and behavior that depends upon
the capacity for learning and transmitting knowledge to succeeding generations;￿
and ￿the customary beliefs, social forms, and material traits of a racial, religious,
or social group; (and) the set of shared attitudes, values, goals, and practices that
characterizes an institution or organization.￿
Economists model individuals as economic agents who make choices in an eco-
nomic and institutional environment, given their preferences and beliefs. Consider
two hypothetical societies faced with identical institutional and economic settings.
3There is no agreed upon de￿nition. By 1950, Kroeber and Kluckhohn (1952) provided over
150 de￿nitions.
3Suppose that, despite these identical environments, these societies end up with dif-
ferent outcomes, re￿ ecting the fact that their inhabitants made di⁄erent choices.
We would like to say that these choices di⁄ered because these societies possessed
di⁄erent cultures, i.e., because they di⁄er in their distributions of preferences and
beliefs across individuals Thus, for the purposes of what I will be discussing, a
more useful working de￿nition is to consider di⁄erences in culture as systematic
variation in beliefs and preferences across time, space, or social groups.
Why should societies di⁄er in their distributions of preferences and beliefs?
This can happen for a variety of reasons. One possibility is that di⁄erences
arise because actions are taken in an environment that resembles a game with
multiple equilibria. In this case, non-identical outcomes are simply the result of
the di⁄erent strategies chosen by individuals re￿ ecting their di⁄erent expectations
about the equilibrium outcome. Alternatively, the agents across the two societies
could possess di⁄erent priors about, for example, the payo⁄s to various actions,
which could have resulted from di⁄erent histories (obtained, for example, from
di⁄erent realization sequences of aggregate shocks).4
It may be useful to explicitly note here that nothing in this conception of
culture considers it as either irrational, static, or slow changing. In particular, a
de￿nition of culture that considers the latter to be slow-moving (see, e.g. Guiso,
Sapienza, and Zingales (2006)5) is rejected. The speed of cultural change depends
on how quickly social beliefs and preferences change over time, which in turn
depends on the environment broadly speaking, including the opportunities which
determine individuals￿learning pace, their interactions with others, and particular
historical experiences. A salient example of a cultural change that began slow
and accelerated considerably is seen in the social attitudes towards married women
working. As shown in Figure (1) below (from FernÆndez (2007a)), beliefs in the
US of the propriety of a married woman working if she had a husband ￿capable
4See FernÆndez (2007a) for a model of cultural change as a process of endogenous intergener-
ational learning. If societies obtained di⁄erent shocks, that would lead them to learn at di⁄erent
rates and would give rise to di⁄erent actions on average.
5Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2006) de￿ne culture as ￿those customary beliefs and values
that ethnic, religious, and social groups transmit fairly unchanged from generation to generation.￿
4of supporting her￿evolved dramatically over the 20th century, going from under
20% of the population being in favor of this in 1936 to less than 20% being against
it in the 1990s.
Figure 1: Fraction that approves of wife working if husband can support her. (Data
Source: WVS.) Picture from FernÆndez (2007).
Di⁄erent historical experiences have important repercussions on individuals￿
beliefs and preferences. As shown by Alesina and Fuchs-Schundeln (2007), for
example, Communism had a signi￿cant e⁄ect on the beliefs of people who lived
under it. The authors study German attitudes towards the role of the state in
two main areas of social security: the extent of state provision desired in case of
unemployment or illness and the extent to which the state should provide ￿nancial
security for families, old-age or for people needing care.6 They ￿nd that if an
individual lived in East Germany prior to reuni￿cation, she/he is much more likely
to favor government provision for ￿nancial security for all of the areas mentioned
above, after controlling for traits such as age, education level and type, gender,
6The answers for each question ranged from 1 to 5 which correspond to ￿only the state,￿
￿mostly the state,￿￿ state and private forces,￿￿mostly private forces,￿and ￿only private forces.￿
5number of children, marital status, occupation, income, among others. This is
independent of whether the responder lived in the former East or West Germany
at the time of the survey.
The allocation of land titles to squatters in Argentina in 1989, as shown in
DiTella, Galiani, and Schargrodsky (2006), likewise provides vivid testimony to
the power of past experience. Hundreds of squatter families occupied an area of
wasteland in the outskirts of Buenos Aires which belonged to many di⁄erent private
owners. The government attempted to redistribute the land to the squatters by
buying it, but not all private owners were willing to sell. The squatters who had
settled on tracts bought by the government obtained full property rights. The
authors argue that this can be viewed as a case of random assignment and they
provide evidence that the family heads in the group that received land titles are
similar in age, gender, education levels, and ethnic origin to the ones in the group
that did not. Despite the economic similarities across the two groups (those with
land titles and those without), answers to survey questions regarding individualism,
materialism, and trust di⁄ered markedly across them, with the group that received
property rights demonstrating beliefs which are more aligned with those of the
general Buenos Aires population. Namely, the squatters who were granted property
rights were more likely than their counterparts without these rights to believe that
success can be achieved alone, that money is important to happiness and that one
can, in general, trust other people. Interestingly, however, the beliefs of the two
groups regarding the role of merit do not di⁄er signi￿cantly (perhaps re￿ ecting the
role of luck in determining who obtained property rights).
A last example is provided by Giuliano and Spilimbergo (2009) who use survey
questions to show that an individual￿ s (regional) location at age 16 a⁄ects her/his
adult attitudes. In particular, individuals who grew up in an area a⁄ected more
severely by recession were more likely to believe in luck and redistribution and to
have less con￿dence in institutions such as Congress and the executive branch of
the federal government.7
7Speci￿cally, the authors use the answers to questions in the GSS which asked the individual
6In addition to history, there is abundant evidence that attitudes are transmit-
ted from parents to children. For example, Dohmen, Falk, Hu⁄man, and Sunde
(2008) use German data to show that a child￿ s propensity to trust and her/his
attitudes towards risk (as measured in answers to survey questions at age 23) is
strongly positively correlated with parental attitudes.8 FarrØ and Vella (2007)
use a sample of mother-child pairs to show that mothers transmit their attitudes
regarding women￿ s role in the labor market to their children. On the other hand,
Cipriani, Giuliano, and Jeanne (2007) do not ￿nd a signi￿cant correlation in the
way in which parents and their children play public goods games, but their sample
is quite small.9
As noted in the introduction, there is plenty of evidence that economic out-
comes and social beliefs are correlated. At the national level, for example, the
extent to which executives believe that labor relations are good is correlated with
union density across countries as shown in Figure (2) from Aghion, Algan, and
Cahuc (2008).10 A di⁄erent example is provided by Figure (3) from Alesina and
Giuliano (2007) that shows a negative correlation across between the strength of
family ties and the ratio of girls to boys in tertiary education.11
A signi￿cant correlation between attitudes and outcomes is also found at the
individual level within the same national environment. For example, Vella (1994),
using Australian data, shows that attitude variables are correlated with the extent
whether she believed in government intervention to reduce income inequality and improve stan-
dards of living, as well as questions that asked inviduals to express the degree of con￿dence in
various government branches and whether luck is a driver of success.
8The results for risk remain signi￿cant and strong even after controlling for region where
individual lived for the last 15 years, religion, ethnicity, subjective health status, income, and
years of schooling, as well as a dummy for whether the family lived in East Germany before 1989.
Interestingly, the mother￿ s attitudes towards trust have a much stronger correlation with those
of the child and the e⁄ects of both parents￿attitudes decrease with birth order.
9The authors conduct the experiment with 38 parent-children pairs recruited from the same
public elementary school in Washington, DC.
10The authors use executives￿responses across more than 50 countries to the statement ￿La-
bor/employer relations are generally cooperative￿from the Global Competitiveness Reports.
11To measure the strength of family ties, the authors use answers to a series of question in the
World Value Survey that attempt to assess how important the family is in a person￿ s life, the
degree to which one should love and respect one￿ s parents regardless of their characteristics, and
whether parents have a duty to do their best for their children even at the expense of their own
well-being.
7Figure 2: Correlation between union density and executives￿beliefs that the labor rela-
tions are cooperative. (Data Sources: OECD and GRC 1999 database.) Picture from
Aghion, Algan and Cahuc (2008).
of a woman￿ s involvement in market work and FarrØ and Vella (2007) ￿nd that a
mother￿ s attitudes towards working women is correlated with her daughter￿ s labor
market decisions as well as those of her son￿ s spouse. Dohmen, Falk, Hu⁄man,
Sunde, Schupp, and Wagner (2005) show that risk attitude measures from survey
questions in Germany are correlated with a variety of risky behavior including
tra¢ c o⁄enses, portfolio choice, smoking, risk in occupational choice, participation
in sports, migration and overall life satisfaction.
Of course, correlation does not imply causation. Before turning to the epi-
demiological approach, the next section reviews some of the experimental literature
that attempts to show the e⁄ect of culture by comparing the decisions of individ-
uals from di⁄erent societies who face identical controlled environments.
8Figure 3: Relationship between strength of family ties and the ratio of girls to boys in
tertiary education. (Data Source: WVS.) Picture from Alesina and Giuliano (2007).
2.1 Some Experimental Evidence
Experiments constitute an obvious methodological choice to investigate cultural
di⁄erences as they can be transposed to various geographical locations and con-
ducted with locally recruited samples.12 Overall, however, the prevalence of small
sample sizes and the fact that many experiments are conducted with college stu-
dents makes it di¢ cult to control for individual characteristics that may potentially
di⁄er in important ways across various groups. Below I give a brief review of some
of the work in this area.
Evidence suggestive of cultural di⁄erences in players￿choices of strategies in
a given game is found by many authors. For example, Chuah, Ho⁄mann, Jones,
and Williams (2007) and Chuah, Ho⁄mann, Jones, and Williams (2009) use the
ultimatum game to investigate whether UK and Malaysian subjects exhibit di⁄er-
ential behavior when bargaining within and across their national groups. They
￿nd stronger evidence of ￿home country bias￿on the part of Malaysians. Namely,
12Roth, Prasnikar, Okuno-Fujiwara, and Zamir (1991) point out, however, various problems
with experimental design in multinational experiments, namely, how to control di⁄erences in
languages, currencies and experimenters.
9Malaysian students o⁄ered higher shares to their countrymen than UK proposers
gave to theirs, whereas Malaysians gave lower o⁄ers to UK nationals than to their
own countrymen. UK proposers, on the other hand, did not change their o⁄ers
when bargaining with Malaysians. Neither nationality was punished or rewarded
for using di⁄erent strategies, as the authors found that the rejection rates were not
di⁄erent for the two groups.
Roth, Prasnikar, Okuno-Fujiwara, and Zamir (1991) compared how individu-
als in four international cities play market games versus bargaining games. Inter-
estingly, they found no cultural di⁄erences in the behavior of individuals in market
games, whereas there were signi￿cant di⁄erences in the way bargaining games were
played, giving greater credence to a cultural explanation.13 Henrich (2000) ￿nds
that the Machiguenga tribe of the Peruvian Amazon, when playing the ultimatum
game, makes signi￿cantly smaller o⁄ers than a control group in Los Angeles and
that the former also has a lower rejection rate. In post game interviews, tribal
members explained that they accepted low o⁄ers because they did not want to
reject any money. The proposers also expected their low o⁄ers to be accepted.
Henrich, Boyd, Bowles, Camerer, Fehr, Gintis, and McElreath (2001) sum-
marizes the results of experiments conducted in 15 small-scale societies in various
countries. They had individuals play various games, including the ultimatum,
dictator and public goods game and found important di⁄erences across societies in
the average outcomes. They argue that this may re￿ ect di⁄erences in culture that
arise from di⁄erent structures of production requiring a smaller or greater degree
of cooperation among individuals.
Does the fact that di⁄erent societies play these games di⁄erently re￿ ect dif-
ferent cultural attitudes? Even leaving aside the (critically) important issue of
whether these results are driven by systematic di⁄erences in individual character-
istics, a meta-analysis of 37 papers conducted by Oosterbeek, Sloof, and van de
Kuilen (2004), which includes 75 results from ultimatum game experiments, ￿nds
13They study market behavior using ￿rst price auctions, where all buyers have the same valu-
ation. As predicted by standard theory, they found that the seller obtained the entire surplus.
10that di⁄erences in game outcomes are not re￿ ected in variations in attitudes. The
authors use answers to several questions in WVS to construct a measure of average
attitudes across countries that re￿ ect the respect for authority, trust, and compe-
tition. They regress the outcomes (e.g. the share o⁄ered and the rejection rate)
on variables such as the amount o⁄ered, regional dummies, the Gini coe¢ cient
in the country, GDP per capita and the average attitude as constructed from the
WVS. They tend to ￿nd that attitudes are insigni￿cant in explaining the varia-
tion. Of course, it is quite possible that the attitudes chosen by the authors are
not capturing the cultural features that are relevant for these outcomes or that
the demographic groups from which the experimental subjects are drawn do not
have the average attitudes of their countries. Nonetheless, this ￿nding suggests
that one must be cautious about the cultural interpretation of experimental results
based on small samples and on subjects whose individual characteristics are not
controlled for.
3 The Epidemiological Approach
The essence of what I call the epidemiological approach is the attempt to identify
the e⁄ect of culture through the variation in economic outcomes of individuals who
share the same economic and institutional environment, but whose social beliefs
are potentially di⁄erent. Very often, the focus is on the economic behavior of
immigrants or their descendants, but this need not always be the case (see, e.g.,
Fisman and Miguel (2007) and Miguel, Saiegh, and Satyanath (2008)).14 This
approach is reminiscent of that used by epidemiologists (hence the name) who,
in order to attempt to distinguish the genetic contribution to disease from the
physical (including cultural, e.g. diet) environmental contribution, study various
14 Studying outcomes for the second generation rather than the ￿rst-generation immigrants
o⁄ers some advantages. It avoids some of the confounding di¢ culties that ￿rst-generation
immigrants are more likely to su⁄er to varying degrees such as the ability to speak the host
country language and the prevalence of ties with non-immigrating family members. These
factors are likely to be less important for the second generation.
11health outcomes for immigrants and compare them to outcomes for natives.15
To understand the strengths and weaknesses of an epidemiological approach
to medical issues, suppose that the incidence of, say, heart disease di⁄ers markedly
between two countries (the source and host countries). If the incidence of heart
disease in immigrants converges to that of the natives in the host country, the
di⁄erence between the two countries is unlikely to be driven by genetics and instead
results from the environment. Failure to ￿nd convergence, on the other hand, does
not imply the opposite. Even when the environment is the sole responsible, there
are still many ways to sustain di⁄erential levels of heart disease. For example,
cultural assimilation may occur slowly (for instance, if immigrants maintain the
same dietary patterns as in the source country), or living in the source country at
a young age may confer some degree of immunity, or selection into immigration
may be correlated with a particular health outcome.
In economics, unlike in medicine, the epidemiological approach attempts to
distinguish between cultural versus environmental factors contributing to individ-
ual variation (and thus the environment now includes the economic and (formal)
institutional settings that may a⁄ect outcomes, but excludes culture). The rea-
soning underlying this strategy is that (i) parents transmit their cultural beliefs
to their children; (ii) cultural beliefs vary across (immigrant) groups in a system-
atic fashion re￿ ecting culture in the country of origin; (iii) individuals who live
in the same country or in the same appropriately de￿ned geographical area, face
similar economic and formal institutional environments. The idea is thus that in-
dividuals from di⁄erent cultures will take di⁄erent actions despite facing identical
environments.
The basic empirical exercise uses data on individuals that live in one given
country but whose parents were born in some other country ￿ the country of
ancestry. With this data one can estimate the probability that an individual i
15See, for example,the classic study by Marmot, Syme, Kagan, Kato, Cohen, and Belsky (1975).
The methodological basis for this approach to culture in economics is developed in FernÆndez
(2008) and the explanation o⁄ered here follows closely the one laid out there.
12from country-of-ancestry c takes some action, yic;
yic = ￿0 + ￿1Xi + ￿2Yc + "i (1)
in which Xi is a vector of individual characteristics, Yc is a proxy for culture
in country c, and "i is an error term. Thus, Xi can consist of demographic
information such as gender and age as well as measures of household income,
education, etc. The primary variable of interest is the one that attempts to
capture culture in the country of ancestry. Although it is possible to simply use a
country-of-ancestry dummy for this variable, a superior strategy is to use a variable
that more directly re￿ ects the cultural attitudes of interest. For example, if yic is a
labor force participation decision for a woman whose parents were ￿rst generation
immigrants, then Yc could be the female LFP in her parents￿home country.
One may question the epidemiological approach described above for a vari-
ety of grounds. First, parents are not the only (nor necessarily even the most
important) transmitters of culture; the relationships and institutions of the local
environment (schools, local institutions, neighborhood, etc.) will also impact an
individual￿ s beliefs. Culture, furthermore, is socially constructed: to be replicated,
the behavior may require the incentives ￿rewards and punishments ￿provided by
a larger social body.16 Second, although studying the descendants of immigrants
rather than immigrants directly allows one to avoid some potential problems (see
footnote 14), it also means that the impact of culture from the source country
is likely to have been attenuated over time. Both of these factors will lead to
an underestimation of the e⁄ect of culture on economic outcomes in the above
speci￿cation. Nonetheless, for a wide variety of issues, there appears to be a
signi￿cant correlation between attitudes in the home country and attitudes ex-
pressed by immigrants and their descendants. This can be seen, for example, in
the attitudes towards trust as shown in Figure (4) from Guiso, Sapienza, and Zin-
16FernÆndez and Fogli (2009) show that, in fact, the impact of culture appears to be greater
for the descendants of those immigrant groups that have a greater tendency to cluster in the
same neighborhood.
13gales (2006), or in the attitudes towards redistribution in Figure (5) from Luttmer
and Singhal (2010).17 Third, immigrants (and their descendants) from di⁄erent
countries may face di⁄erent economic and institutional environments within the
host country. Fourth, immigrants are not a random sample of a source-country￿ s
population. I will discuss the potential problems that the last two concerns pose
for the estimation strategy in greater detail below, in the context of an example.
Figure 4: Correlation between trust level of country of origin and trust level of immigrants
relative to Great Britain. (Data Sources: World Values Survey, General Social Survey.)
Picture from Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2006).
17 As a measure of trust, Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2006) use the answer to the binary
question in WVS "Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that
you have to be very careful in dealing with people?" to construct a dummy which takes a value
1 if the person answered that people could be trusted. Luttmer and Singhal (2010) measure
preferences for redistribution using the European Social Survey (ESS). Individuals are given
the statement ￿the government should take measures to reduce di⁄erences in income levels￿and
the responses are measured in a scale of 1 to 5, ranging from strong disagreement to strong
agreement.
14Figure 5: Preferences for redistribution by immigrant group and country of birth. (Data
Source: ESS.) Picture from Luttmer and Singhal (2010).
3.1 An Example
In order to understand the strengths and weaknesses of the epidemiological ap-
proach to culture, I will develop it in greater detail in the context of a simple
model of a married woman￿ s decision to work in the formal labor market.
3.1.1 A Simple Model
Let￿ s start with the work decision of a (married) woman i in country k. For sim-
plicity, I model solely the extensive margin and treat the utility from consumption
and disutility from working as separable. Thus, a woman￿ s work decision can be
thought of as the solution to the maximization of the following utility function:
U(c;vi) = u(c) ￿ 1vi
where u is a strictly increasing, concave utility function, 1 is an indicator function
that takes the value one if she works and zero otherwise, c is household consump-
15tion, and vi is woman i￿ s disutility from working.
A woman￿ s consumption is the sum of her labor income (if she works), wf,
and her husband￿ s wages, wh (i.e., consumption is a public good at the household
level). Husbands are assumed to always work. For simplicity, the level of wages
is taken as exogenous and identical for individuals within the same country but is
potentially di⁄erent across countries. Thus,
c = whk + 1wfk
The disutility of work, vi, varies across women and is assumed to be a random
draw from a country-speci￿c distribution with mean mk and variance ￿2, with a cdf
denoted by Gk (mk;￿). Thus, for simplicity, di⁄erences in culture across countries
with respect to women￿ s work are modeled as (exogenous) di⁄erences in the mean
of the distribution that characterizes the disutility of working. Note that there are
two sources of heterogeneity in the model: a within-country heterogeneity across
women in the same country re￿ ected in the fact that they obtain di⁄erent prefer-
ence draws from a given distribution, and cross-country heterogeneity re￿ ected in
the mean of the preference distribution from which women obtain individual-level
preference draws.
Given wages in country k, whk and wfk, and the distribution of preferences in
the country, Gk, we can solve for the level of female labor force participation in
that country, Lk. It is given by the cdf evaluated at v￿
k, i.e.,







￿ (whk;wfk) = u(whk + wfk) ￿ u(whk)
is the level of disutility from work in country k which makes a woman indi⁄erent
between participating in the labor market or not.
If, for concreteness, we assume that G is a normal distribution and ￿(x) is the







summarize, the women that choose to work are those whose disutility of working
lies below the critical level v￿
k, which depends only on the wages in that country,
whk;wfk.
Note that both culture and the economic/institutional environment play a role
in determining the level of women￿ s labor force participation. Culture matters
since it shifts the distribution from which preferences are drawn, by changing mk
(without a⁄ecting v￿
k).18 Cultures that have more negative views about women













where ￿(x) is the pdf associated with standard normal distribution ￿(x).
Economic/institutional di⁄erences across countries also matter. In this simple













￿ )[u0(whk + wfk) ￿ u0 (whk)] <
0. Thus an increase in female wages will lead to an increase in a country￿ s level
of female LFP whereas an increase in the male wage leads to a decrease.
Next, consider a random sample of women from di⁄erent countries of ancestry
k; (k = 1;2;:::;n), all living in the same country j. Suppose that these women
are identical in all but their cultural beliefs. In particular, suppose that they
are endowed with identical husbands (i.e., they do not di⁄er in their earnings)
and that they face the same formal institutional environment so that their market
wages, wfj;whj, are the same. Hence v￿ will be the same across all women,
even though they have di⁄erent countries of ancestry. We will also assume that
culture is transmitted perfectly by parents, i.e., these women inherit the same vi
draws as their (foreign-born) mothers. The proportion of women who will work,
however, will di⁄er across countries of ancestry k since each of their vi are drawn
from di⁄erent distributions. In particular, assuming a normal distribution for
18In more general models, culture will also a⁄ect v￿
k by a⁄ecting, for example, the supply of
labor and through it, wages.







. Note that, as shown in equation (2), women whose mothers
were born in countries that have less favorable views of working women will be
less inclined to work, as their disutilities vi will be drawn from distributions with
higher values of m. Thus, from a theoretical perspective, culture not mattering
requires the distribution of distribution of preferences/beliefs to be identical across
countries (mk = m; 8k = 1;:::::n).
3.1.2 Empirical Issues
Because cultural di⁄erences (mk) are not observable, in order to conduct an em-
pirical analysis akin to equation (1) one needs to ￿nd variables which can function
as proxies for cultural attitudes. In the context of the model above, a good proxy
for a woman￿ s culture could be the level of married women￿ s LFP in her country
of ancestry or a measure of attitudes in that country towards married women who
work.19
There are several important issues that must be addressed before one can con-
clude that a statistically signi￿cant coe¢ cient on the cultural proxy in equation (1)
constitutes even moderately persuasive evidence that culture matters. First, there
are many sources of heterogeneity across women other than their cultural beliefs.
To the extent that these sources of heterogeneity are orthogonal to culture, it is
simple to include them in the vector of individual characteristics. The compara-
tive statics of equation (2) will then still be valid. Many of these characteristics,
however, are endogenous outcomes that may well be in￿ uenced by culture. In
the context of a woman￿ s work decisions, her desire to acquire higher levels of
education, the state/neighborhood where she lives, and the characteristics of her
husband are a few of the more salient variables that may be in￿ uenced by culture.
Thus, by including them in a regression one is e⁄ectively testing whether culture
has an in￿ uence on work outcomes beyond the ways in which it is already re￿ ected
in these choices. It is important to note that in this case the failure to ￿nd a
19See FernÆndez and Fogli (2009) for the former and FernÆndez (2007a) for the latter.
18signi￿cant coe¢ cient on the cultural proxy is not an indication that culture does
not matter.
Second, these women may not be randomly selected in the sense that their
immigrant parents may be a selected sample from the distribution of beliefs in
the country of ancestry. Thus, the cultural attitudes which were transmitted to
their descendants may not be representative of the country￿ s culture. Once again,
a ￿nding of an insigni￿cant coe¢ cient on the cultural proxy cannot lead one to
rule out the possibility that culture matters. The interpretation of a signi￿cant
coe¢ cient on the cultural proxy, on other hand, depends on the issue being studied.
In the case of women￿ s work outcomes, selection would invalidate this ￿nding
only if parents from di⁄erent countries came from systematically di⁄erent parts
of an otherwise identical distributions of beliefs and preferences across countries.
For a positive coe¢ cient on the cultural proxy of female LFP to be driven by
selection would require countries to have identical distributions of preferences but
that those parents (immigrants) from high female LFP countries be drawn from
a di⁄erent part of the distribution than the ones from low female LFP countries.
In particular, it would require the former to be drawn disproportionately from the
low disutility-of-labor portion of the distribution and the opposite for latter. How
reasonable this possibility is depends upon the issue being studied. It is worth
noting, in any case, that selection is a problem for all empirical methodologies, as
even random experiments can su⁄er from the possibility of attrition with selection
on unobservable variables.
Third, and perhaps the most critical issue, is whether there exists an omitted
variable that varies in a systematic fashion across country of origin for purely eco-
nomic reasons. In the context of our example of married women￿ s LFP, variables
such as her education, her husband￿ s income, and her geographic location are all
likely candidates that might re￿ ect underlying economic di⁄erences across individ-
uals rather than culture. Thus, controlling for these characteristics is important
in this regard as well, despite their potential endogeneity.
While controlling for observed individual characteristics is straightforward (as-
19suming that the data is available), the issue of unobserved heterogeneity remains;
there may well be an omitted variable that is correlated with the country of an-
cestry. How to deal with this possibility depends on the question that is being
studied. Tackling this issue is fundamental, however, as the ability of the new
epidemiological literature to be persuasive depends on how well this issue is ad-
dressed.
In the case of culture and female LFP, the most likely candidate for an omitted
variable is unobserved human capital. For example, it is possible that women
with higher levels of (unobserved) human capital would choose to supply more
labor to the market since their wages are higher. The most direct way to test
for the presence of di⁄erent human capital levels is via a Mincer regression on
wages. After controlling for the usual variables in a Mincer regression (schooling,
experience, experience squared and location), the cultural proxy should not have
additional explanatory power for women￿ s wages. If it does, then it is more
likely that unobserved human capital is responsible for the correlation between
culture and women￿ s labor supply. Other possible variables that one can use to
control for an individual￿ s unobserved human capital (assuming that individual
IQ or individual test scores are unavailable) include proxies for the quality of
education of the parents or parental human capital. In order to do this, one can
employ either direct measures of the latter￿ s education or average test scores on
standardized international tests (a la Hanushek and Kimko (2000)) in the country
of ancestry as a measure of the parents￿quality of education.20
Fourth, it should be noted that although using variables related to the eco-
nomic outcome of interest is in many ways a superior approach to the ￿black box￿
of a country dummy, there may be issues with this alternative. On the one hand,
making use of an economic variable is preferable since it facilitates formulating al-
ternative hypotheses regarding the critical issue of a potentially omitted variable.
On the other hand, the variable used as a cultural proxy may itself not re￿ ect
20FernÆndez and Fogli (2009) conduct a large battery of tests, including the ones mentioned
above, to persuade the reader that an omitted variable is not responsible for their results.
20cultural di⁄erences across countries since this source of variation may be swamped
by their economic and institutional di⁄erences. For example, one could imagine a
country which despite having more conservative attitudes towards women working,
could also have higher female wages or a better child-support mechanism, result-
ing in an overall higher female-LFP-rate than that in a less conservative country.
Using alternative proxies (or more directly a country dummy) will eliminate this
concern.
It should be noted explicitly that the epidemiological approach is biased to-
wards ￿nding that culture does not matter. As mentioned previously, the fact
that parents are only one source of cultural transmission among many and that
they may have cultural attitudes that di⁄er from the average ones in the country
of ancestry, implies that one is more likely to rule the cultural proxy insigni￿cant.
Thus, just like the absence of convergence in disease does not provide de￿nitive
evidence in favor of genetics, the absence of a signi￿cant coe¢ cient on the cultural
proxy does not imply that only the economic and institutional setting matters.
4 The Epidemiological Literature in Economics
The ￿rst paper to use the epidemiological approach was Carroll, Rhee, and Rhee
(1994). They used individual-level data on immigrants to Canada to investigate
whether cross-country di⁄erences in savings rates were culturally driven. They
estimated individual consumption levels as a function of permanent income, demo-
graphics, and region of origin. The authors found that although recent immigrants
tended, on the whole, to save less than native-born Canadians, their saving pat-
terns did not vary signi￿cantly by region of origin. Given this negative ￿nding, it
is perhaps not surprising that for some time no further attempts were made using
this methodology. In more recent years, however, the epidemiological approach
has been used to study the impact of culture on various economic outcomes such
as women￿ s work, fertility, labor market regulation, corruption, redistribution, and
￿nancial participation to name a few topics. Below I review some of this literature.
214.1 Women￿ s Work, Fertility, and Gender Preferences
Not surprisingly, issues which concern women (e.g. female labor force participation
and fertility) have been a popular focus for work in culture and economics since
attitudes towards women have evolved signi￿cantly over the last century across
most of the developed countries.
Reimers (1985) is an early attempt to examine the role of ethnicity in mar-
ried women￿ s labor force participation in the United States. Using a standard
regression approach with ethnicity dummies, she ￿nds mixed results regarding the
importance of ethnicity for female LFP. The women in the sample she studies
have been in the US for varying time periods, however, which is perhaps partially
responsible for these results.
Antecol (2000) uses male and female LFP in the country of ancestry to examine
whether culture plays a role in determining the inter-ethnic gender gap in labor
force participation rates in the United States. She studies both ￿rst-generation
immigrants and second and higher-generation individuals, which she groups into
the same category. The results are suggestive that ethnicity matters although the
absence of key individual-level variables leaves open the possibility that the results
could be driven by omitted factors such as education or di⁄erences in parental
background that lead to systematic variations in unobserved human capital.
The concern above is mitigated in FernÆndez and Fogli (2009) who use various
measures of parental education and unobserved human capital (including average
test scores in the country of ancestry and wages as described in the prior section)
to rule out this alternative transmission channel. They show that culture plays a
quantitatively signi￿cant role in explaining variation in women￿ s work and fertility
outcomes. The authors also examine whether it is her or her husband￿ s country-
of-ancestry that drives their results. Interestingly, they ￿nd that both matter but,
if anything, the husband￿ s culture has a larger impact on his wife￿ s labor supply
than her own cultural background.
An alternative to proxying culture with aggregate economic variables from
22the country-of-ancestry (such as female LFP above) is to make use of indicators
of social attitudes prevalent in those countries. The important issue of reverse
causality discussed previously is avoided by using the epidemiological approach.
The ￿rst paper to do this is FernÆndez (2007a). She uses the attitudes towards
women￿ s work expressed by individuals in the woman￿ s country of ancestry as a
cultural proxy to study the work outcomes of second-generation American women.
She ￿nds that cross-European variation in answers to questions about women￿ s role
in the 1990 WVS has explanatory power for the 1970 work outcomes of second-
generation American women from these countries of ancestry, even after control-
ling for individual di⁄erences such as those in education, location, and husband￿ s
characteristics.21 Figure (6) from FernÆndez (2007b) shows the raw correlation
between the cultural proxy (in this case, female labor force participation in 1990 in
the country of ancestry) and the 1970 work outcome for second-generation Amer-
ican women from that country of ancestry, measured in hours worked per week.22
Another strand of literature focuses on the e⁄ect of culture over another im-
portant outcome for women, fertility. This literature includes, for example, Guin-
nane, Moehling, and ￿￿ GrÆda (2006) who study Irish fertility in the United States
in 1910, and Blau (1992) who examines the fertility behavior of ￿rst-generation
immigrant women in the United States. These investigations are based on immi-
grants directly and therefore face the usual issues associated with immigration such
as selection and the possible disrupted and delayed fertility behavior. The analy-
sis of FernÆndez and Fogli (2006) and FernÆndez and Fogli (2009) mitigates these
concerns by studying second-generation American women. Using past values of
the total fertility rates from the woman￿ s country of ancestry as a cultural proxy,
21The WVS statements with which individuals are asked to agree or disagree (with various
degrees of intensity) are: 1. Being a housewife is just as ful￿lling as working for pay; 2. Having
a job is the best way for a woman to be an independent person.
22Note that if the way in which culture evolves is relatively stable across countries, it is possible
to use future levels of the outcome as a cultural proxy, e.g., female LFP in 1990 is used to explain
work behavior in 1970.
23Figure 6: Hours worked and culture (Female LFP in 1990). (Data Source: ILO and US
Census.) Picture from FernÆndez (2007).
they ￿nd that the latter has explanatory power for fertility outcomes, leading them
to conclude that culture plays an important role.
On a related issue, Almond, Edlund, and Milligan (2009) investigate the role
of culture in son preference. The authors note that sex ratios at birth are above
the biologically normal level in a number of Asian countries. They investigate
whether this is a result due to traditional economic reasons associated with poverty
and/or to the existence of a rural or discriminatory environment that renders sons
more valuable, or whether it is instead due to culture. To do this, they use an
epidemiological approach and study Asian immigrants to Canada. They ￿nd that
sex ratios for these immigrants rise with parity (i.e. with the number of children)
if there was no previous son. In particular, those families whose ￿rst two children
were girls are signi￿cantly more likely both to have a third child and for that child to
be a boy, if they originally emigrated from India, China, Korea, or Vietnam. Since
these immigrants no longer live in rural environments and poverty is presumably
no longer an issue, culture is likely to be responsible for these results.23
23Unfortunately, they do not control for household income explicitly.
244.2 Family Ties, Political Engagement, and Labor Market
Regulation
The type of relationships people possess may have a cultural component which
can a⁄ect economic outcomes. For example, the degree of attachment to one￿ s
family may in￿ uence one￿ s political attitudes or lead to economic concessions as
individuals may have greater stakes in remaining in the same location. Relatedly,
the perceived quality of the relationship between workers and management may
also have important economic consequences.
In a series of papers, Giuliano and various coauthors establish that there
is cross country variation in how families are viewed and that these views are
correlated with a series of political and economic outcomes. First, as shown
in Giuliano (2007), the living arrangements of second-generation immigrants in
the US tend to follow the cross-European cultural patterns from their country
of ancestry. In particular, individuals of Southern European descent in the US
are more likely to live with their parents during the ages of 18 to 33 than the
descendants of immigrants from other European countries.
Second, Alesina and Giuliano (2009) use questions in the WVS to construct
a measure of the average ￿strength￿of family ties across European countries.24
They ￿rst show that, within a country, individual answers to these questions have
predictive value for an individual￿ s political participation and general interest in
politics.25 Next, they follow the epidemiological approach by using the country-
level measure of the strength of family ties as a cultural proxy for second-generation
nationals. That is, within a given host country, say Germany, second-generation
Germans are associated with the Turkish value of the strength of family ties if
their parents came from Turkey and with the Italian value if their parents came
24The authors use answers to a series of questions in the World Value Survey that attempt to
assess how important the family is in a person￿ s life, the degree to which one should "love and
respect" one￿ s parents regardless of their characteristics, and whether parents have a duty to do
their best for their children even at the expense of their own well-being.
25 To assess the latter, the authors use questions which ask respondents about their general
interest in politics and their interest in engaging in political conversations with friends. Political
action is measured using a list of political activities that the respondent has engaged in.
25from Italy. Using host country dummies and data from European Social Survey,
the authors show that the cultural proxy has explanatory power for within-country
variation in political attitudes of individuals from di⁄erent countries of ancestry.26
In particular, they ￿nd that second-generation immigrants are themselves less likely
to be interested in politics if their father￿ s country of origin had a high average level
of family ties. Their analysis includes a series of individual-level characteristics
such as education categories, employment status, and a measure of family income.
The fact that they consider second-generation immigrants across 32 destination
countries strengthens the analysis as it is less likely that the results are driven
by some special feature of a destination country. They interpret their ￿nding as
evidence of the importance of ￿amoral familism￿in which strong family ties have
a negative in￿ uence on social capital.
The strength of family ties also matters for labor market outcomes. Using the
CPS from various years, Alesina, Algan, Cahuc, and Giuliano (2010) show that
second-generation Americans whose parents come from countries with stronger
family ties tend to have lower geographic mobility, a higher probability of unem-
ployment, and lower hourly wages even after controlling for individual character-
istics such as age, education, marital status, gender, and number of children as
well as state ￿xed e⁄ects. They interpret this result as evidence that individuals
who have a more family-focused culture are less able to take advantage of labor
market opportunities due to their lower willingness to move away from their family
in response to adverse local conditions.
Culture can also impact the labor market at the institutional level. Aghion,
Algan, and Cahuc (2008) argue that bad labor relations and low unionization rates
lead governments to set more stringent minimum wage policies in order to better
protect workers. In a series of cross-country comparisons, they ￿rst show that
the stringency of the state￿ s regulation of the minimum wage in OECD countries
is negatively correlated with both executives￿and workers￿beliefs in the quality
26The authors use questions concerning political attitudes in the ESS, which are very similar
to the ones mentioned in footnote (25). For further details, see Alesina and Giuliano (2009).
26of labor relations, whereas the unionization rate is positively correlated with these
beliefs. They next use an epidemiological approach to show that there exists a cul-
tural component to an individual￿ s attitudes towards unions and her/his likelihood
of belonging to a union. In particular, they examine the relationship between two
cultural proxies for the country of ancestry - union density and a composite mea-
sure of state regulation of minimum wage - and two outcomes for second generation
immigrants in the US: the degree of con￿dence an individual expresses about labor
unions as well as the probability that the respondent belongs to a union.27 They
control for various individual-level characteristics but their use of the General So-
cial Survey signi￿cantly restricts the number of countries of ancestry (twelve only)
and provides only rough categories for critical variables such as income. Thus,
although their ￿nding that union density and minimum wage legislation in the
country of ancestry has a signi￿cant impact on both an individual￿ s con￿dence in
unions and her/his probability of participating in one (in the US) is suggestive, it
is also open to other interpretations. For example, it may be that an individual￿ s
occupation may be more or less prone to being unionized in a way that is correlated
with her/his country of ancestry.
4.3 Corruption, Redistribution, and Violence
Is there a link between culture and the extent to which countries engage in redistri-
bution?28 Luttmer and Singhal (2010) take a step towards establishing this link by
using an epidemiological approach to show that individual preferences for redistri-
bution exhibit a cultural component. They study (mostly European) immigrants
to 32 European host countries and show that preferences for redistribution in the
country of origin can help explain the variation in the immigrants￿preferences for
27The authors construct a composite index to measure the degree of state regulation of the
minimum wage. It is a combination of stringency measures, such as the existence of minimum
wage legislation, and the ￿level￿of the minimum wage, which the authors measure as the ratio
of the minimum wage over the median wage in the economy. For further details, see Aghion,
Algan, and Cahuc (2008).
28For of a review of this literature, see Alesina and Giuliano (this volume).
27redistribution in the host country.29 This result holds even after controlling for
several individual characteristics such as income, education, employment status,
and host country ￿xed e⁄ects.30 The fact that the authors consider immigrants
across 32 destination countries strengthens the analysis as it makes it less likely
that the results are driven by some special feature of a destination country. The
cultural e⁄ects are large in the sense that a one-standard deviation increase in
the average preference for redistribution across birth countries is associated with
a greater than one-standard-deviation decrease in the log of household income.
A rather di⁄erent take on the epidemiological approach is Fisman and Miguel
(2007). The authors investigate the parking behavior of United Nations o¢ cials
in Manhattan. As in studies based on immigrants or their descendants, this work
follows an epidemiological approach by studying a select group of individuals (UN
o¢ cials) in the same geographical environment (Manhattan). Until 2002, diplo-
matic immunity protected U.N. diplomats from parking enforcement prosecution,
so their actions were presumably constrained by cultural norms alone. The authors
￿nd that diplomats from countries with high levels of corruption (based on existing
survey-based indices) accumulated signi￿cantly more unpaid parking violations.
Fisman and Miguel￿ s ￿nding is intriguing as it seems to indicate that countries
with high levels of corruption also have cultures which facilitate corrupt behav-
ior. Does the failure to pay parking tickets when one is not legally required to
do so, however, indicate corruption? An alternative explanation may be that
highly corrupt countries face a di⁄erent set of social problems that are far more
serious than parking violations, leading to a culture in which these comparatively
trivial issues are ignored. Moreover, even if one accepts the authors￿interpreta-
tion of their results, an important remaining issue is whether the UN o¢ cials from
countries with di⁄erent levels of corruption face di⁄erent likelihoods of punish-
ment at home . If they do, then it would be unclear whether culture or economic
29Preferences for redistribution are measured by the average answer to the ESS question which
asks respondents how strongly they agreed/disagreed with the statement that ￿the government
should take measures to reduce di⁄erences in income levels￿ .
30A similar analysis, but for second-generation immigrants to the US rather than Europe, is
performed by Alesina and Giuliano (this volume).
28rewards/punishments underlie their ￿ndings since this would imply that the insti-
tutional setting in which these o¢ cials operate may not truly be one and the same
(the UN and Manhattan) but may also involve the institutions from their country
of origin.31
Violence may also have a cultural component. By studying individuals from
di⁄erent nationalities who are all involved in the same activity ￿soccer ￿Miguel,
Saiegh, and Satyanath (2008) ￿nd an ingenious way to keep the environment con-
stant. The authors examine the relationship between a country￿ s history of civil
war and a soccer player￿ s propensity to engage in violence on the soccer ￿eld as
evidenced in his incidence of yellow and red cards (indicating a violent foul) when
playing in one of six major European leagues. These leagues include players from
70 countries and all continents.
Controlling for a variety of important characteristics such as the position and
league played in, the number of games, the quality of play (goals scored), etc.,
Miguel et al. ￿nd that players from countries with higher civil war incidence ac-
cumulate a greater number of yellow and red cards. The inclusion of continent
dummies to some extent helps rule out alternative explanations such as racial dis-
crimination by the referees. While it may be that, as in the study of parking
violations and corruption, di⁄erent home institutions are responsible for this be-
havior (e.g., perhaps future coaching opportunities on a home team depend on the
degree to which violence is punished domestically), this concern seems less pressing
in this arena than in the former study.
4.4 Within-Country Migration: Shirking and Financial Par-
ticipation
Di⁄erent cultures can coexist within the same country, particularly across di⁄erent
geographical regions. Ichino and Maggi (2000) use movers from and to di⁄erent
regions of Italy in an attempt to investigate the role of culture in the higher inci-
31The authors only deal with this issue partially by ascertaining that the length of a diplomat￿ s
tenure is uncorrelated with the number of parking violations early in her/his career.
29dence of shirking found in Southern versus Northern Italian employees. As shown
by the authors, the rate of absenteeism in the South is almost double that in the
North of the country. The authors￿results are suggestive of a role for culture in
this phenomenon since, when faced with a common environment, and after control-
ling for several individual and local characteristics, individuals born in the South
but working in the North continue to have greater shirking rates than comparable
Northern workers.
Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2004) also study movers within Italy to attempt
to identify the e⁄ect of civic capital on ￿nancial development. They use indicators
of how much people rely on ￿nancial markets, such as the use of checks, reliance
on cash, stock holdings and access to credit markets, as these are presumably
correlated with ￿nancial development. They measure civic capital in an ingenious
fashion, using not only the degree of electoral participation but also the quantity
of voluntary blood donations in each province.32 As in the prior study, the use of
movers allows the authors to control for cross-regional variations in the e¢ ciency
of institutions.33
Guiso et al. use a dummy variable for the individual￿ s place of residence and
another one for the individual￿ s origin to identify the e⁄ect of her/his culture. They
￿nd that people who were originally from provinces with higher civic capital make
larger investments in stocks, rely more on checks to settle transactions, and have
easier access to loans. It should be noted that while the authors interpret the latter
￿nding as resulting from trustworthiness, it is also consistent with discrimination.
4.5 Cultural Change and Changes in Economic Outcomes
As discussed previously, there is no reason to believe, a priori, that culture changes
only slowly. Algan and Cahuc (2010) exploit time variation in measures of indi-
vidual trust to show that trust can impact economic growth. Suppose that income
32This is the number of 16 oz blood bags per individual in each province in 1995.
33As an example of institutional cross-variation, the completion of similar courtroom trials can
range from 1.4 to 8.3 years across di⁄erent regions of Italy.
30per capita Y in country c at time t can be written, in a cross-country regression
form, as:
Yct = ￿0 + ￿1Sct + ￿2Xct + Fc + Ft + ￿ct
where Sct measures the country average of social attitudes of individuals who live
in country c in period t; Xct denotes a vector of average characteristics of the
population and past economic development of the economy; Fc stands for country
￿xed e⁄ects and captures all other time invariant speci￿c features in the country
such as legal origins, endowments, or past institutions with long-lasting e⁄ects; Ft
stands for period ￿xed-e⁄ects common to all countries and ￿ct denotes an error
term.
The problem with the speci￿cation above is that contemporaneous social at-
titudes, Sct, are likely to be correlated with the unobserved error term (if, for
example, higher per-capita income increases trust). Here is where the authors
employ the epidemiological approach.34 Assuming that contemporaneous social
attitudes are formed both by attitudes inherited from previous generations as well
as by the contemporaneous environment allows the authors to write:
Sct = ￿0 + ￿1Sc;t￿1 + ￿2Xct + ￿c + ￿t + ￿ct
where ￿c and ￿t stand for country and time dummies respectively; Sc;t￿1 denotes
the social attitudes of the prior generation; and ￿ct is an error term. The assump-
tion that social attitudes from period t ￿ 1 do not directly a⁄ect Yct, along with
the assumption that ￿ct ? Sc;t￿1, allows the authors to identify the parameters of
the system of equations.
Given that standardized cross-country databases on social attitudes of earlier
generations are not available, the authors proxy the inherited attitudes of people
living in country c at time t by the social attitudes that Americans born in the US
inherited from forebears coming from country c. As shown by Guiso, Sapienza,
34In fact, a prior version of this paper was titled "Social Attitudes and Economic Development:
An Epidemiological Approach".
31and Zingales (2006) (see Figure (4)), there is a positive correlation between the
trust levels of immigrants and their descendants in the US and trust levels in
the country of ancestry.35 Using the fact that the GSS identi￿es whether one￿ s
parents or grandparents were born outside the US, the authors use variation in the
arrival times of the individual￿ s ancestors to the US to proxy for attitudes in two
di⁄erent time periods: 1935-1938 and 2000-2003. Note that this strategy deals
not only with the lack of historical data on trust attitudes but also ensures that
contemporaneous events that might a⁄ect attitudes in the country of ancestry do
not a⁄ect the cultural proxy, which is the inherited portion of culture for second,
third, and forth generation Americans.36
The authors ￿rst show that the level of trust transmitted from the source
countries has changed over the two time periods. They then demonstrate that the
change in trust explains a signi￿cant portion of the variation in change in per capita
income for the 24 countries in their sample. This is an intriguing ￿nding. The
causal interpretation relies on inherited attitudes and contemporaneous economic
outcomes not being codetermined by some common factors, however. The authors
attempt to mitigate this concern by using longer time lags between the outcomes
and the inherited attitudes. A theory that would allow us to understand why
trust changed over time and to identify the sources of change in the data would
further strengthen their ￿nding.
35The authors use the answers to simple binary question on trust. See footnote (17).
36Assuming generations of 25 years, inherited trust in 1935-1938 would be relected in the
beliefs of second-generation Americans born before 1910 (i.e. whose parents arrived for sure one
generation before 1935), of third-generation Americans born before 1935 and of fourth-generation
Americans born before 1960. In the same way, inherited attitudes in 2000-2003 are those inherited
by: second-generation Americans born between 1910 and 1975, by third-generation born after
1935 and by fourth-generation Americans born after 1960. For the authors, second-generation
Americans are those whose both parents were born in the US; third-generation Americans at
least two grand-parents but not all immigrated to the US; and fourth-generation Americans had
all grand-parents born in the US.
32Figure 7: Correlation between change in income per capita and change in inherited
trust between 2000 and 1935. (Data Sources: Maddison database and GSS 1977-2004.)
Picture from Algan and Cahuc (2010)
5 Concluding Questions and Remarks
The empirical work on culture has evolved considerably over time. It is my belief
that the evidence that culture matters for a large variety of economic outcomes
is by now su¢ ciently strong that most readers would ￿nd it convincing. There
are many exciting questions left open, however. We would like to understand,
for example, how culture propagates and evolves. The evidence presented in this
paper shows that cultural preferences and beliefs have a life of their own in the
sense that, even when removed from the environment in which they originated, they
continue to exercise in￿ uence over individual outcomes. The evidence also shows,
however, that there is some convergence over time both in economic outcomes and
in attitudes. This indicates, not surprisingly, that culture changes in response to a
new environment. Culture and the economic environment are. moreover, unlikely
to be independent variables. Take, for example, attitudes towards premarital sex;
these are likely to depend on contraceptive technology, the availability of abortion,
33and a woman￿ s ability to support a family on her own.37 Culture, however, also
in￿ uences the economic and institutional environment. A culture that considers
sex to be shameful is less likely to make contraception or abortion easily available.38
Thus culture and the economic and institutional environment interact and in￿ uence
one another. Studies of this interaction would be an important addition to the
literature.
Related to the topic discussed above is the question of why culture sometimes
changes quickly and at other times glacially. This may be, at least in part, a
response to the pace of change in the technological environment. This is not the
only possibility, however. As shown in FernÆndez (2007a), cultural change can
also arise from people endogenously learning about their environment. The author
develops a dynamic model of culture in which individuals hold heterogeneous beliefs
regarding the relative long-run payo⁄s for women who work in the market versus
the home. These women do not know the long-term consequences of market work
for their marriages and their children￿ s welfare. Their beliefs, however, and those
of their descendants, evolve rationally via an intergenerational learning process in
which they learn about the long-term payo⁄s from working by observing (noisy)
private and public signals.
The process described above generically generates an S-shaped ￿gure for fe-
male labor force participation, which is what is found in the data. The S shape
results from the dynamics of learning. When either small or large proportions of
women work, learning is very slow and the changes in female labor force participa-
tion are also small. When the proportion of women working is close to 50%, rapid
learning and rapid changes in female LFP take place. Thus, a learning model is
also able to explain why culture changes at times slowly and at other times quickly,
giving rise to an evolution in social attitudes similar to that shown in Figure (1).
It is also important to gain a deeper understanding of when cultural di⁄erences
37See FernÆndez-Villaverde, Greenwood, and Guner (2010) for an interesting study of this
issue.
38For example, although the FDA approved the ￿rst oral contraceptive in 1960, it was not
until the Supreme Court￿ s decision in 1972 that it became available to unmarried women in all
states.
34are simply manifestations of multiple equilibria versus when they re￿ ect a deeper
disagreement. As discussed in Postlewaite (this volume), for example, the concern
with rank, which varies across societies, may not indicate fundamental di⁄erences
in preferences but arise instead from selecting di⁄erent equilibria in a model of
multiple equilibria.
In the model developed by Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite (1992), individuals
have standard preferences over consumption and their children￿ s utility. Individ-
uals are assigned some initial distribution of wealth, and men in the ￿rst genera-
tion are arbitrarily assigned a social rank which has no assumed correlation with
wealth. The social arrangement (i.e., the equilibrium behavior) prescribes assor-
tative matching between men￿ s rank and women￿ s wealth, with the highest ranked
man matching with the wealthiest woman, etc.. The punishment for violating this
prescription (which only women would be tempted to do) is that the rank of the
male o⁄spring from such a union would be reduced to zero. This implies that these
sons will be matched with relatively poor women. Thus, a woman will rationally
choose to match with a less wealthy but higher-ranked man if the decrease in her
son￿ s future consumption due to her deviation is su¢ ciently large.
The authors show that the behavior described above in which rank mat-
ters (called ￿aristocratic matching￿ ) is an equilibrium for some parameters of the
in￿nite-horizon model. There is also always an equilibrium, however, in which
aristocratic rank plays no role and individuals sort simply on the basis of wealth,
with the wealthiest man marrying the wealthiest woman etc. It is important to
note that these two societies will look very di⁄erent not only because they give
rise to di⁄erent marital patterns, but also because they will give rise to di⁄erent
savings and bequest levels. In particular, in the aristocratic matching equilibrium,
parents have less of an incentive to leave a large bequest to their male o⁄spring
since the bequest itself does not change their son￿ s match in the marriage mar-
ket. This is not so in the equilibrium in which both sexes match on wealth alone.
Thus, one would expect families to save more in the latter equilibrium, changing
fundamental economic outcomes.
35As noted in FernÆndez (2008) in a slightly di⁄erent context, behavioral dif-
ferences arising from true di⁄erences in preferences versus those which are simply
manifestations of multiple equilibria may be more di¢ cult to distinguish in reality.
It is likely that over time, the concerns for aristocratic rank (like the preferences
for blue eyes in Mailath and Postlewaite (2003)) evolve in such a way that they
become incorporated in deep preferences or beliefs. This would make them more
robust in the sense that small changes in the environment would not necessarily
eliminate this equilibrium even if it were no longer tenable as equilibrium behavior
with standard preferences. This raises the important question of where preferences
and beliefs come from and the extent to which cultural transmission is purposeful,
that is, optimizing on the part of an individual or her parents.39;40 Lastly, it should
be noted that if cultural variations are manifestations of endogenous di⁄erences
in preferences rather than re￿ ections of either di⁄erent priors (as in FernÆndez
(2007a)) or multiple equilibria arising from standard preferences (as in the Cole,
Mailath, and Postlewaite (1992) paper discussed above), this raises di¢ culties for
welfare analysis. Once preferences are endogenous, the standard welfare theorems
no longer apply leaving open the question of how policies should be evaluated.
This is an important question that requires further investigation.
39Cultural transmission may well be involuntary. FernÆndez, Fogli, and Olivetti (2004) show
that whether a man￿ s mother worked while he was growing up is positively correlated with
whether his wife works, even after controlling for a whole series of socioeconomic variables. They
interpret this as preference transmission, but whether it is voluntary ￿optimizing ￿or simply by
example is an open question.
40See Bisin and Verdier (2000) for a model in which parental e⁄ort a⁄ects the probability
with which children inherit their parents￿preferences. See Bisin and Verdier (this volume) and
Postlewaite (this volume) for excellent reviews of this literature.
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